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Abstract
In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geo-
graphic location of traders matters very little, ﬁerce competition between providers
of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce interme-
diaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show that two non-identical shops
may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers is suﬃciently diﬀerentiated in
their time preferences. In such an equilibrium less patient sellers choose the more
popular (with a higher rate of arrival of new buyers) and more expensive shop, while
more patient sellers prefer the less popular and cheaper one.
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In the modern world buyers and seller increasingly rely on the internet where information
about products and prices is easily collected and geographic boundaries stop playing a
signiﬁcant role. The possibility to trade through websites led to a boom on the secondary
market where people trade second-hand electronic devices, household objects, etc. If in
old times a person who wished to buy some used item would have to visit a local ﬂee
market, search through garage sales, or read local newspaper ads, nowadays this can be
done by a few mouse-clicks. Current internet marketplaces are big bazaars that pool
buyers and sellers without respect for geographical locations, where each buyer is likely
to ﬁnd exactly the product that she is looking for. Examples of such marketplaces are
abound, including Cellbazaar, Amazon, eBay, Yahoo among many others.
There are two main features that diﬀerentiate virtual marketplaces from traditional
ones. First, in a traditional market a seller is usually charged only a ﬂat fee for using
a trading place during some period of time; more elaborate fees that depend on sales or
revenue are diﬃcult to monitor and enforce. In contrast, in internet transactions a lot
more information is recorded, so service fees can depend on more variables, in particular,
on the amount of revenue the seller receives. So, the ﬁrst question we address is:
What is the optimal structure of service fees for an e-commerce intermediary?
The second feature is that it is costless to list and display a product at internet
shops. Moreover, a geographical location of a seller does not matter for listing a product
(it may matter only afterwards, when the product is sold, in terms of shipping costs).
This background stimulates ﬁerce competition among internet shops, until the strongest
survives. This is the case for eBay which took over more than ﬁfteen internet auction
companies that operated on local as well as international markets in the last twelve years1
1The list of eBays acquisitions includes Up4Sale.com, Butterﬁeld & Butterﬁeld, Alando (Germany),
Half.com, Internet Auction Co. (South Korea), iBazar (France), CARad.com, EachNet (China),
Baazee.com (India), Marktplaats.nl (Netherlands), Shopping.com (US), Tradera (Sweden), StubHub
(US), GittiGidiyor (Turkey), StumbleUpon (Canada), Afterbuy (Germany).
1and driven out of market others.2 However, there are many competing intermediaries in
some speciﬁc internet markets. For example, Amazon competes with Barnes & Noble, as
well as with other smaller shops on the internet book market. Thus the second question
that we address is:
What is the equilibrium market structure for competing internet intermedi-
aries? Will one e-commerce company eventually monopolize the market, or
can competitors coexist in equilibrium?
We model two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) that compete for sellers.
Each shop charges sellers two service fees: a listing fee, a ﬁxed amount paid by a seller in
every period for having his object listed, and a closing fee, a percentage of the price after
the object has been sold. The fees are announced at the beginning of the game and stay
ﬁxed thereafter. Sellers are drawn at random from a heterogeneous population. A seller
observes the service fees and then, repeatedly in discrete periods, decides at which shop
and at what price to list his object. Each period buyers arrive to internet shops according
to a Bernoulli process. We assume that internet shops diﬀer in the probability of buyers’
arrival.3 A buyer purchases the listed product if her willingness to pay exceeds the listed
price; otherwise she leaves and never returns. The game ends after the object has been
sold (or consumed by the seller himself).
Under the assumption that internet shops are at least as patient as sellers (in their
preferences over time), our analysis provides a new insight regarding optimal selection of
service fees. We show that a positive listing fee is never optimal, and, consequently, in
any equilibrium the listing fee must be equal to zero. The intuition behind this result is
as follows. When a shop is more patient than a seller, due to a distortion between their
interests the price chosen by the seller is too low from the perspective of the shop; the
2eBay’s main competitors, Yahoo and Amazon, discontinued their Internet auction service, Yahoo on
June 16, 2007 and Amazon on September 8, 2008.
3Empirical observations support our assumption about diﬀerent popularity of internet shops – see
the literature on the market structure of e-commerce (e.g., Brown and Morgan, 2009; Goldmanis et
al., 2010). The search literature also provides several models where diﬀerent shops will have diﬀerent
popularity (e.g., Stahl, 1989, 1996).
2distortion is minimized when the listing fee is zero. Thus, we show that a shop’s policy is
eﬀectively one-dimensional: it is the choice of its closing fee only.
Second, we characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria in our model and show that there
exists at most one equilibrium which, depending on the model parameters, may be one of
the following types: monopoly, contestable monopoly or market segmentation.A ni n t e r n e t
shop becomes a monopoly if it is so popular (relative to the competitor) that sellers of all
types prefer it even if the monopoly fees are charged. A contestable monopoly equilibrium
arises if shops are not too diﬀerent in their popularity and the pool of sellers is not too
diﬀerentiated. It is a result of a standard Bertrand competition, where a more popular
internet shop (with a higher rate of buyers’ arrival) sets fees so low that sellers of every
type will be attracted to that shop, and the competitor is forced to leave the market.
Monopoly or contestable monopoly are, probably, most expected market structures.
However, if sellers are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, a market segmentation equilibrium ob-
tains, where both internet shops receive positive proﬁt. This situation takes place if the
more popular shop can obtain higher expected payoﬀs by attracting only sellers of a spe-
ciﬁc type (rather than all types, as it is in the contestable monopoly). This allows its
competitor to set low positive fees, attract sellers of a diﬀerent type, and obtain a positive
expected payoﬀ as well. This equilibrium is a result of “seller’s diﬀerentiation” where
sellers are discriminated on the basis of their time preferences. Less patient sellers are
naturally attracted to the more popular shop that provides a larger number of buyers in a
short while. In contrast, more patient sellers are not so constrained by time, so they can
aﬀord to wait longer for a successful sale by listing the product at the less popular but
cheaper internet shop. This equilibrium resembles classical results for an oligopoly with
diﬀerentiated products (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Singh and Vives, 1984), except in
our model products are identical, but sellers are diﬀerentiated in their time preferences.
Finally, in Section 6 we show that the results can be extended to more general trade
mechanisms, including, most notably, internet auctions, where objects are sold via a
Vickrey auction. Ellison, Fudenberg, and M¨ obius (2004) in a related article on competing
auctions (see also Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, 2008) ﬁnd that whenever two auction inter-
3mediaries co-exist in equilibrium, the “law of one price” (i.e., the same expected closing
price and the same buyer/seller ratio across competing auctions) should hold. This result
relies on the assumption that bidders can freely choose between auction houses. Con-
trarily to Ellison, Fudenberg, and M¨ obius (2004), Brown and Morgan (2009) demonstrate
in ﬁeld experiments that eBay prices were consistently higher than those on Yahoo, and
eBay attracted more buyers per seller. Our market segmentation equilibrium suggests an
explanation for Brown and Morgan’s (2009) ﬁndings.
In a related paper, Baye and Morgan (2001) consider a model with one proﬁt-maximizing
intermediary. They are interested in the price dispersion phenomenon on the internet
markets and in overall welfare eﬀects of introducing internet shopping. Baye and Mor-
gan’s (2001) framework has a number of diﬀerences from ours. Most notably, there is a
monopoly intermediary in their model, while we analyze competitive internet shops; the
interaction in their model is one-shot, while we have a multi-period trade; their interme-
diary can charge only listing fee from the sellers, while we allow for a two-dimensional fee
structure.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Sections 3
and 4 we derive the optimal behavior of a representative seller and the competing internet
shops. Section 5 characterizes all equilibria. In Section 6 we extend our basic model to
allow for more general trade mechanisms. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Let N be a large (inﬁnite) population of buyers and M be a large (inﬁnite) population
of sellers. Every buyer i ∈Nis characterized by her private use value vi ∈ [v,v]o ft h e
object. All private use values are independent and identically distributed according to
distribution function F. Every seller s ∈Mis characterized by two independent private
parameters: his use value vs ∈ [v,v] and discount factor δs. We assume sellers’ use values
are independent and identically distributed according to distribution function G and that
δs has either low (δL) or high (δH) value with probability α and (1−α) respectively, where
40 <δ L ≤ δH < 1a n dα ∈ [0,1]. We also assume that functions F and G are diﬀerentiable





G(z) are strictly increasing on (v,v), where f and g denote the
corresponding density functions.4
The timing of the game is as follows. In period 0, two intermediaries (internet shops)
j =1 ,2 simultaneously announce sellers’ fees for all subsequent transactions: listing fees,
cj ≥ 0, and closing fees, a fraction μj ∈ [0,1] of the price. The fees are commitments that
cannot be altered in later periods.5 In discrete periods t =1 ,2,... buyers arrive to shops
and observe what is on sale. Each shop j is characterized by the rate of arrival of buyers,
the probability ηj that a new buyer arrives in every period. The shops may have diﬀerent
arrival rates buyers. If η1 >η 2, that is, shop 1 expects more buyers to show up in any
ﬁxed time frame, then we say that shop 1 is more popular.
After the service fees have been announced, a representative seller is drawn from
population M. Then, in each period t =1 ,2,... the seller chooses a shop j to list his
product and a price to be listed (he may switch between shops or update the price freely
after every period). Alternatively, he decides to consume the object (and thus receive the
payoﬀ equal to the object’s use value vs). If in period t the object is listed in shop j,
with probability ηj a buyer (randomly drawn from population N) arrives, and purchases
the object if and only if her use value is greater than the price; otherwise she leaves and
never returns. Regardless of the outcome, the seller pays to shop j the listing fee, cj, and,
in addition, if the object is sold, the closing fee, fraction μj of the price. If the object is
purchased or consumed, the game ends; otherwise it proceeds to the next period.
Distribution functions F and G and parameters α, δL, δH, η1 and η2 are common
knowledge. We also assume that all players are risk neutral.
4This is a standard assumption in the literature (e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Krishna,
2002).
5It is important that the listing fees are nonnegative, that is, internet shops only collect fees from
sellers and do not pay to sellers. This constraint is naturally satisﬁed in real life. Trade intermediaries
sell products on behalf of the owners, charge fees for the service, and do not purchase any products.
53 Seller’s Decision Problem
In this section we describe and solve the seller’s decision problem. Consider a seller with
use value vs ∈ [v,v] and discount factor δs ∈{ δL,δ H}. Given the stationary environment,
we will consider seller’s time-invariant (Markov) strategies.
The seller observes the fees of both shops, (c1,μ 1)a n d( c2,μ 2), and makes the following
decisions. First, given the fees, he calculates his expected revenue from using shop 1 and
shop 2. Then, he makes an allocation decision (λ1,λ 2), where λj is the probability that
the object is listed at shop j =1 ,2, and 1 − λ1 − λ2 is the probability that the object is
consumed, λ1,λ 2 ∈ [0,1], λ1 + λ2 ≤ 1.
Let us calculate the seller’s expected revenue from using shop j. Suppose that the
seller has chosen shop j for listing the object. For every seller’s price pj,d e n o t eb yQj(pj)
the probability that the object is sold in shop j in the following period, so we have
Qj(pj)=( 1− F(pj))ηj,
where ηj is the probability that a buyer arrives to the shop and 1−F(pj) is the probability
that her use value is above pj.D e n o t e b y uj(pj,u ∗) the seller’s expected revenue from
using shop j,w h e r eu∗ is the highest continuation payoﬀ that the seller expects to obtain
in the next period if the object is not sold.6 Thus,
uj(pj,u
∗)=−cj + Qj(pj) · (1 − μj)pj +( 1− Qj(pj)) · δsu
∗. (1)
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6We assume that the seller does not derive any utility from the object before it is sold or consumed.
6and
pj =¯ v, if δsu
∗ ≥ (1 − μj)
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Let us now consider the seller’s allocation decision (λ1,λ 2). The seller makes an
allocation decision (to consume the object or to list it at shop 1 or 2) which maximizes
his expected payoﬀ. Note that since in every period the seller faces ex-ante the same
environment, if he chooses shop j once, then he will choose it in all periods until the
object is sold.
Let u∗
j be the expected seller’s payoﬀ if he tries to sell the object at shop j in all
periods. From (1) it follows that u∗


















The next lemma states that equation (4) has a unique solution.
Lemma 2 The mapping uj(pj(·),·) has a unique ﬁxed point.
The seller chooses (λ∗
1,λ ∗











2 +( 1− λ1 − λ2)vs. (5)
We say that a seller prefers shop i to shop j if u∗
i ≥ u∗
j. Thus, the seller lists the object
at a preferred shop and receives max{u∗
1,u ∗
2} whenever this revenue exceeds his use value
vs, otherwise, he consumes the object and receives vs.
Observe that the expected payoﬀ from shop j, u∗
j, and the optimal price pj(u∗
j)d o
not depend on the seller’s use value, vs, but they depend on the seller’s discount factor
δs. Indeed, a more patient seller chooses a higher price and receives a higher expected
revenue after listing the object. Therefore, sellers with the same discount factor have the
same preference over shops, and only sellers with diﬀerent discount factors may prefer
diﬀerent shops. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to a more (less) patient
seller with discount factor, δH (δL), as an H-type (respectively, L-type) seller.
74 Optimal Fees
A seller’s behavior as a function of the shops’ fees was described in the previous section.
In this section, we consider how shops choose their fees.
4.1 Payoﬀs
Consider shop j =1 ,2. The probability that a new buyer arrives is ηj > 0 in every period.
We assume that both shops have the same discount factor γ ∈ (0,1] and are more patient
than the sellers, γ ≥ δH(≥ δL).7 It is standard in the literature to assume that a ﬁrm (an
internet shop) is more patient than an individual (a seller).
Fix shops’ fees a1 =( c1,μ 1)a n da2 =( c2,μ 2), the seller’s use value vs and his discount
factor δθ, θ ∈{ L,H}.D e n o t e b y λθ
j(a1,a 2) the probability that a θ-type seller chooses
shop j,b yuθ
j(aj) the seller’s expected payoﬀ from listing the object with shop j,a n db y
pθ
j(aj) the optimal selling price, j =1 ,2. The expected payoﬀ of shop j conditional on












The next lemma shows that the above equation has a unique solution.
Lemma 3 For every aj =( cj,μ j) ∈ R+ × [0,1] and every θ ∈{ L,H}, there exists a
unique solution, wθ
j(aj), of equation (6).
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 and thus omitted.
The unconditional payoﬀ ¯ wj(a1,a 2)o fs h o pj is given by the product of the conditional











7The assumption that the shops share the same discount factor is not essential for the results and
made for convenience.
8Equation (7) shows that each shop faces the following trade-oﬀ: lower fees lead, on the
one hand, to a higher probability of attracting a seller (or even to stealing a seller from
the competitor), but, on the other hand, to a lower revenue from the transaction.
4.2 Listing Fees
This section addresses and partially answers one of the main questions of this paper:
What are the optimal fees? We will show that if a shop makes a positive proﬁt in an
equilibrium, the listing fee in that equilibrium must be zero.
Theorem 1 Let (c1,μ 1) and (c2,μ 2) be arbitrary fees of the shops. If shop i receives
a positive expected payoﬀ and ci > 0, then (ci,μ i) is not a best reply of shop i to the
competitor’s fees (cj,μ j), j  = i.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. Suppose that a seller has chosen shop i. Since
the seller is less patient than the shop, he will always choose his selling price lower than
the price which maximizes the expected payoﬀ of the shop.8 Since ci > 0, shop i can
change the fees: increase closing fee μi and decrease listing fee ci, such that the seller’s
expected revenue does not change, but his “virtual continuation value” δsvs
1−μi increases. By
equation (3), a higher “virtual continuation value” leads to a higher selling price, which
in turn increases the expected revenue of the shop.
It immediately follows from Theorem 1 that if a shop has a positive expected payoﬀ
in an equilibrium, then its listing fee must be equal to zero. However, in an equilibrium
where shop i has zero payoﬀ (and thus no deviation can lead to a positive payoﬀ), every
fee (ci,μ i) is a best reply, that is, all strategies of shop i lead to the same zero payoﬀ. To
simplify notations and characterization of equilibria, we will assume that if shop i has zero
payoﬀ in an equilibrium, then ci = 0. This assumption and Theorem 1 give the following
corollary.
8The assumption that the shops are at least as patient as sellers is important. The result in Theorem
1 need not hold if a suﬃcient fraction of the sellers’ population is more patient than the shops.
9Corollary 1 In every equilibrium the listing fees of both shops are equal to zero.
Corollary 1 allows us to ﬁx listing fees at zero and describe the shops’ strategies as
the choice of closing fees only. In what follows, we will assume that the listing fees are
zero. Thus, the notation for strategy aj =( cj,μ j)o fs h o pj will be replaced by μj and
understood as aj =( 0 ,μ j). Therefore, from (7), the unconditional payoﬀ ¯ wj(a1,a 2)=











We say that shop i is more popular than shop j if it attracts more buyers, i.e., ηi >η j.
Without loss of generality, we assume that η1 ≥ η2.
Since the expected seller’s revenue depends on the probability that a new buyer arrives,
it is easy to see that selling an object in the more popular shop yields a higher selling price.
Thus, if two shops charge equal fees, any seller (whether H-type or L-type) will prefer the
more popular shop, and hence the less popular one attracts no sellers and receives zero
payoﬀ.
Suppose that the shops are equally popular, η1 = η2. Since in an equilibrium shops
compete only in closing fees, they are engaged in the classic Bertrand competition: a shop
with a lower closing fee is more attractive to a seller of any type. It immediately follows
that closing fees must be equal to zero in an equilibrium.
Proposition 1
(i) If the shops are equally popular, η1 = η2, then there exists a unique equilibrium where
all fees are equal to zero, (c1,μ 1)=( 0 ,0) = (c2,μ 2).
(ii) If shop 1 is more popular, η1 >η 2, then it sets a positive closing fee in equilibrium,
μ1 > 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 characterizes completely the equilibria in the case of equally
popular shops. In what follows, we will analyze a more complicated case, η1 >η 2.I n
10order to understand how the sellers of diﬀerent types choose between the shops that are
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Figure 1: Indiﬀerence curves of L and H types of sellers
Figure 1 illustrates the indiﬀerence curves of L and H types of sellers for the case of
η1 >η 2. For every closing fee μ2 of shop 2, let φθ(μ2) denote the critical level of μ1 such
that with these fees a θ-type seller, θ = L,H, is indiﬀerent between the two shops. The
graph {(φθ(μ2),μ 2):μ2 ∈ [0,1]} represents the indiﬀerence curve of a θ-type seller. Note
that at the point (μ1,μ 2)=( 1 ,1) the indiﬀerence curves for both seller types coincide,
since in this case the shops claim the entire surplus, leaving sellers with zero expected
revenue, regardless of their types. Two curves φL(μ2)a n dφH(μ2) divide the closing fee
space, μ1 × μ2, into three areas:
A is the area where μ1 is too high relative to μ2, so that all sellers prefer shop 2;
11B is the area where sellers with diﬀerent patience levels prefer diﬀerent shops;
C is the area where μ2 is too high relative to μ1, so that all sellers prefer shop 1.
It is important to note that more popular shop 1 can always guarantee to attract
L-type sellers by setting its closing fee μ1 ≤ μ  
1. Furthermore, it can always guarantee
to attract all sellers by setting its closing fee μ1 ≤ μ 
1, no matter what closing fee μ2 is
chosen by shop 2. In contrast, less popular shop 2 cannot guarantee to attract any type
of sellers.
It is clear from Figure 1 that if an H-type seller is indiﬀerent between two shops, then
L-type seller prefers more popular shop 1.
Proposition 2 If η1 >η 2, then φH(μ2) <φ L(μ2) for every μ2 < 1.
Intuitively, for an L-type seller (the impatient one), the possibility to obtain a higher
revenue right now is the dominant factor, and thus he receives a higher payoﬀ from the
more popular shop. To see this, imagine the extremely impatient seller, δL =0 ,w h o
obtains utility only from the current-period sale. In this case, the probability of a new
buyer arrival is of extreme importance for him. In contrast, a more patient seller can
aﬀord to wait and try to sell the object in more than one period, thus, eventually having
a high probability of sale over time, even if the probability of a new buyer arrival is small
in every period.
Thus, depending on model parameters, we might ﬁnd that equilibrium fees are in area
C, so that only the more popular shop is present on the market, or in area B,s ot h a t
both shops are active and receive proﬁt. It is clear that equilibrium fees cannot be in area
A, since the more popular shop can always choose a lower fee and attract one or both
types of sellers.
125 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we will show that if shops are not equally popular, η1 >η 2, then there are
three types of equilibria: monopoly, contestable monopoly,a n dmarket segmentation.
5.1 Monopoly
Suppose that shop 1 is much more popular than shop 2, so that shop 1 is a monopoly on
the market. For illustration, imagine the extreme case, η2 = 0. In this extreme case a
seller with use value vs and discount factor δθ, θ = H,L, will never choose shop 2 for any
(μ1,μ 2). Furthermore, the seller will choose shop 1 (as opposed to consuming the object)
if and only if uθ
1(μ1) >v s.9 Hence, for a given closing fee μ1, the probability that a seller
of type θ lists the object is equal to the probability that vs <u θ
1(μ1), that is, for every

























Therefore, shop 1 solves the following maximization problem
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The following lemma helps to establish uniqueness of the solution.






is strictly concave in μi.
9At i e ,vs = uθ
1(μ1), is a zero-probability event and thus can be ignored in the analysis.
13A solution of (9) is unique, since the sum of concave functions is concave. We will
refer to this solution, denoted by μM
1 ∈ [0,1], as the monopoly closing fee. Further, the
equilibrium where shop 1 sets the monopoly closing fee and attracts all sellers will be
called the monopoly equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let η1 >η 2. The monopoly equilibrium exists if and only if
μ
M
1 ≤ φH(0). (10)
5.2 Contestable Monopoly
Let η1 >η 2 > 0. Consider an equilibrium where more popular shop 1 sets a positive
closing fee less than the monopoly fee, attracts sellers of all types, and receives a positive
expected payoﬀ, while shop 2 attracts no sellers and receives zero payoﬀ. This situation
is a contestable monopoly: more popular shop 1 is a monopolist who is forced to set the
closing fee low enough (lower than the monopoly closing fee) to keep the other shop from
“entering the market” (setting a closing fee above zero) and obtaining a positive expected
payoﬀ. In a contestable monopoly equilibrium more popular shop 1 sets μ1 = φH(0) <μ M
1
and attracts both types of sellers, i.e., λθ
2(μ1,μ 2)=0f o re a c hθ = H,L.
Denote by μθ
i the monopoly fee for shop i who faces the population of sellers consisting
of θ type only,
μ
θ




i (μi) · G(u
θ
i(μi)),θ = H,L, i =1 ,2. (11)
Proposition 4 Let η1 >η 2. A contestable monopoly equilibrium exists if and only if
μ
M
1 >φ H(0) (12)
and








Proposition 4 demonstrates that if shop 1 is more popular than shop 2 and cannot
charge closing fee above φH(0) (because otherwise H-type and maybe even L-type sellers
14would switch to shop 2) a contestable monopoly equilibrium arises with the closing fees
(μ1,μ 2)=( φH(0),0) and λθ
2(φH(0),0) = 0 for each θ = H,L. Condition (13) will be
discussed in further details below.
5.3 Market Segmentation
(Contestable) monopoly is a situation that is natural to see in our model where two
diﬀerent shops compete in service fees for sellers. However, we show that an equilibrium
outcome may be diﬀerent.
Suppose that condition (13) does not hold. It means that shop 1 can obtain a higher
payoﬀ if it attracts only L-type sellers (achieved by charging a closing fee above φH(0))
than if it attracts both types of sellers (achieved by charging closing fee equal to φH(0)).
This can happen, for instance, when the mass of H-type sellers in the population is small
enough. Now, shop 2 can also raise its closing fee to collect a positive revenue from H-type
sellers. Thus, the market is split into two segments where each shop attracts one type of
sellers and receives positive expected proﬁt. An equilibrium where L-type sellers prefer
more popular shop 1 and H-type sellers prefer less popular shop 2 will be called a market
segmentation equilibrium.10
Proposition 5 In a market segmentation equilibrium the following holds:
(i) Each shop sets a monopoly fee on its market segment, i.e., μ1 = μL
1 and μ2 = μH
2 ,




















10Note that the opposite situation, where the L-type sellers prefer less popular shop 2 and the H-type
sellers prefer more popular shop 1, is impossible by Proposition 2.
15(ii) A payoﬀ of shop j depends only on its own fees and is given by












2 (μ2) · G(u
H
2 (μ2)).
Part (i) of the proposition shows that a market segmentation equilibrium can exist
only inside area B (Figure 1) and part (ii) shows that each shop receives the monopoly
payoﬀ on the respective market segment. Note that since the monopoly fees μL
1 and μH
2
are unique, if a market segmentation equilibrium exists, it must be unique.
5.4 Characterization of Equilibria
The following theorem summarizes the above results in Section 5 and completes the
characterization of equilibria.
Theorem 2 There exists at most one equilibrium.
If η1 = η2, then equilibrium closing fees are (μ1,μ 2)=( 0 ,0).
If η1 >η 2, then the equilibrium is either monopoly, contestable monopoly, or market
segmentation equilibrium.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that if an equilibrium exists, it must be one of the types we
have discussed. Furthermore, it is unique11 since each of the equilibrium types is uniquely
deﬁned. Note that since conditions for existence of the monopoly, contestable monopoly,
and market segmentation equilibrium are mutually exclusive and do not cover the entire
set of parameters, it follows that generally an equilibrium (in pure strategies) need not
exist.
11Given our assumption that if a shop receives zero proﬁt in equilibrium, it sets zero fees.
166 General Trade Mechanisms and Auctions
So far we considered the model with a simple trade mechanism where the seller posts a
price and every buyer can only take it or leave it. In this section we will show that our
results extend to a more general class of trade mechanisms that includes, in particular,
Vickrey auction.
Let us call p a reserve price, interpreted as the seller’s declaration of the amount
that he is willing to accept in exchange of his product. A general trade mechanism of
intermediary j is characterized by a pair (Qj,R j), Qj :[ v,v] → [0,1] and Rj :[ v,v] → R,
where for every reserve price p ∈ [v,v], Qj(p) is the probability that the object is sold in
the current period and Rj(p) is the expected revenue from sale. We impose the following
constraints on Qj and Rj:
(a) Qj(p) is weakly decreasing on [v,v] and satisﬁes Qj(v)=0 ;
(b) for every p, Qj(p) strictly increases and Rj(p) weakly increases as the expected num-
ber of buyers per period (the popularity of intermediary j) grows;
(c) Qj(p)Rj(p) is strictly quasiconcave on [v,v].
Condition (a) demands that the probability of sale decreases as the seller raises the
reserve price; condition (b) stipulates that an increase in popularity of an intermediary
raises the likelihood of sale and does not diminish the expected revenue; condition (c) is
technical and guarantees uniqueness of the optimal reserve price.
In our original model, Qj(pj)=( 1− F(pj))ηj and Rj(pj)=pj trivially satisfy (a) –
(c). It is straightforward to verify that after replacement of pj by Rj(pj) throughout the
paper, all the results will continue to hold.12
Let us consider a speciﬁc example. Suppose that there two intermediaries j =1 ,2
(auction houses) that sell products via Vickrey auction.13 In every period t a seller who
12The second part of Lemma 1 that provides an implicit formula for the solution of decision problem
(2) will depend on speciﬁc Qj and Rj.
13Vickrey auction is an approximation of real proxi-bidding that is used in internet auctions.
17have chosen auction house j for listing his object announces reserve price pj,a n dt h e n
a Vickrey auction is run among a random sample of nj bidders drawn from population
N.14 As a result of the auction, the object is transferred to a winner (the highest bidder),
who pays to the seller the price equal to the second highest bid (or the reserve price), or
the object is returned to the seller, if no bid is above the reserve price. Regardless of the
auction outcome, the seller pays to auction house j the listing fee, cj, and, in addition,
if the object is sold, the closing fee, fraction μj of the closing price. If the object is sold,
the game ends, otherwise it proceeds to the next period.
We assume that in auction house j =1 ,2, in each period a new sample of nj bidders
is randomly drawn to participate in the auction. The number of bidders nj is ﬁxed and
commonly known.15 The number of bidders nj that arrive to auction house j in every
period is the measure of popularity of the auction house: a more popular auction house
attracts more bidders.16
Let us calculate the seller’s expected revenue from auction house j. For every reserve
price pj, the probability that the object is sold, Qj(pj), is equal to the probability that at
least one bidder has the use value above pj,t h u s
Qj(pj)=1− F
nj(pj).
14This assumption, together with our objective to maximize the proﬁt of intermediaries rather than sell-
ers, diﬀerentiates this model from the broad literature on auctions with resale (Horstmann and LaCasse,
1997; Gupta and Lebrun, 1999; Haile 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003; Zheng, 2002; Calzolari and Pavan, 2006;
Garatt and Tr¨ oger, 2006; Pagnozzi, 2007). The exceptions are Haile (1999, 2001) who allows new bidders
(in particular, all new bidders) to participate in a re-auction; and Bikhchandani and Huang (1989), Bose
and Deltas (1999, 2007) and Calzolari and Pavan (2006) who model resale to a given secondary market
where the original bidders need not participate; and Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2008) who consider a
similar model with a monopoly auction intermediary.
15 T h er e s u l t sc a nb eg e n e r a l i z e dt ot h ec a s ew h e r et h en u m b e ro fb i d d e r snj is random, drawn from
the same distribution in each period.
16An auction house with ni bidders arriving in every period is not directly comparable to an internet
shop with rate of buyers’ arrival ηj. One way to compare is to assume that one period for the auction
house (the time interval between opening and closing an auction) amounts for k periods in the shop (k
absolute units of time, k>n i), and then to compare the expected numbers of buyers per absolute unit
of time, ni/k and ηj.
18The expected revenue from sale, Rj(pj), is equal to
Rj(pj)=
1













Assumptions (a) – (c) can be veriﬁed for these Qj and Rj, provided F satisﬁes the
monotonic hazard rate condition, i.e.,
f(z)
1−F(z) is strictly increasing (see, e.g., Krishna 2002,
Ch. 2.5).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Rewrite (1) as follows,
uj(pj,u
























The result follows from Lemma 5 below with z = δsu∗
1−μj.
Lemma 5 For every z ≥ v, function Qj(p)(p − z) is strictly quasi-concave in p. A unique
solution p∗ of the maximization problem
max
p∈[v,¯ v]
Qj(p)(p − z) (14)





= z, if z ≤ ¯ v −





∗ =¯ v, if z>¯ v −
1 − F(¯ v)
f(¯ v)
.





− (p − z)

=0 . (15)
By the monotonic hazard rate condition,
1−F(p)
f(p) −(p−z) is strictly decreasing in p for all
z and f(p) is everywhere positive, hence there exists at most one solution of (15). Next,
for p = v we have F(v) = 0, and thus the left-hand side of (15) is strictly positive. For
p = v, there are two cases. If z>¯ v −
1−F(¯ v)
f(¯ v) , then the left-hand side of (15) is positive
for all p in [v,v], and hence the optimal price is p∗ = v. Otherwise, at p = v the left-hand
side of (15) is nonpositive. Thus p∗ is the unique solution of (15). Note also that the
left-hand side of (15) is strictly negative for all p>p ∗ and strictly positive for all p<p ∗,
that is, Qj(p)(p − z) is strictly quasiconcave. End of Proof
Proof of Lemma 2
Equation (4) is equivalent to
u
∗
j =m a x
p












= −cj + δsu
∗











Note that the seller lists her object in shop j only if
cj < (1 − μj)max
p [Qj(p)p]. (17)
It means that μj < 1. After dividing both sides by (1 − μj) and rearranging the terms in
(16), we obtain



















δs ¯ v). Since the left-hand side is increasing and the right-hand side is
decreasing in u∗
j (recall that Qj(·) is non-negative), equation (18) has a unique solution.
End of Proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider arbitrary fees of both shops a1 =( c1,μ 1)a n da2 =( c2,μ 2). Suppose that ci > 0
and ¯ wi(ai,a j) > 0, i = 1 or 2. Since ¯ wi(ai,a j) > 0, shop i attracts a positive measure
of sellers, λH
i (ai,a j)+λL
i (ai,a j) > 0. Suppose that fee ai is shop i’s best reply to the
strategy aj, that is, for every strategy a 
i =( c 
i,μ  
i), ¯ wi(ai,a j) ≥ ¯ wi(a 
i,a j).
Recall that the payoﬀ of θ-type seller, θ = H,L,i sg i v e nb y
u
θ
i = −ci +( 1− μi)Qi(p
θ)p













The payoﬀ of shop i conditional on interaction with θ-type seller, is given by
w
θ
i = ci + μiQi(p
θ)p




















Note that this sum does not depend on the shop i’s fees directly, only via the seller’s
choice of the price pθ. We will show now that, whenever ci > 0, the sum of the seller’s
and shop i’s payoﬀs is strictly increasing in p in a small neighborhood of pθ. Further, we
will show that there exists a fee transformation: higher μi and lower ci that shifts up the
seller’s price, thus increasing in the sum of the payoﬀs and making shop i strictly better
oﬀ.
21Lemma 6 If ci > 0, then for each type θ = H,L there exists a neighborhood of pθ where
W θ
i (·) is strictly increasing.
Proof. After rearranging the terms of (22), we obtain
W
θ









Let p∗ be the price that maximizes W θ










and, furthermore, W θ
i (p) is strictly quasi-concave. Hence W θ
i (p) is strictly increasing in
p whenever p<p ∗.
Solving (19) for uθ




(1 − μi)Qi(pθ)pθ − ci
1 − δθ(1 − Qi(pθ))
.
Solving (21) for wθ





1 − γ(1 − Qi(pθ))
.






(1 − μi)Qi(pθ)pθ − ci
1 − δθ(1 − Qi(pθ))
+ δθ
μiQi(pθ)pθ + ci
1 − γ(1 − Qi(pθ))
≥ δθ
Qi(pθ)pθ









(1 − μi)Qi(pθ)pθ − ci













1−μi whenever ci > 0.
Since z−
1−F(z)
f(z) is strictly increasing, it follows that pθ <p ∗ from (20) and (23). Hence,
W(p) is strictly increasing in some neighborhood of pθ. End of Proof.
We continue with the proof of Theorem 1. Consider a hypothetical situation where
shop i can choose diﬀerent fees, a 
i, only for the current period, while keeping the original
22fees, ai, in the next and further periods (thus aﬀecting only payoﬀs from this period, but
not continuation payoﬀs). By the one-period deviation principle, if no choice of a 
i in the
current period can lead to an increase in i’s proﬁt, neither can any change of fees in all
periods.
Let μ 
i be a closing fee in a small neighborhood of μi, μ 
i >μ i. Since the fees will be
changed only in the current period, the continuation payoﬀ of a θ-type seller, uθ
i,a n dt h e
continuation payoﬀ of shop i conditional on the interaction with θ-type seller, wθ
i,r e m a i n
unchanged. By (20) and by the hazard rate assumption, the price under the new closing
fee, p 












Consider fees (c 
i,μ  
i) such that the listing fee 0 ≤ c 
i <c i and the expected payoﬀ of
shop i is increased by ε in comparison with fees (ci,μ i). Since the total payoﬀ increase is
W θ
i (p 
θ) − W θ
i (pθ), it follows that the seller’s payoﬀ must also increase. Note that, since
only current-period fees are changed, the payoﬀs of shop i and the seller are linear in c 
i (it
is a simple redistribution of the revenue). Hence, for every measures of H-type and L-type
sellers, λH
i (ai,a j)a n dλL
i (ai,a j), the shop can obtain at least ε more revenue, which is a
contradiction that the initial fees (ci,μ i) are optimal. End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part (i). Suppose that η1 = η2. Then a seller of any type prefers the shop with
lower closing fee. If, say, μ1 >μ 2, then shop 2 attracts sellers of both types, H-type
and L-type, and it can proﬁtably deviate by setting a slightly higher closing fee (but still
below μ1). If μ1 = μ2 > 0, then the sellers are indiﬀerent between the shops, and a shop
that attracts not all sellers can proﬁtably deviate by setting a slightly lower closing fee.
Part (ii). Suppose that η1 >η 2 and μ1 = 0. Then a seller of any type strictly prefers
shop 1 (even when μ2 = 0), and thus shop 1 can proﬁtably deviate by setting a slightly
higher closing fee. End of Proof.
23Proof of Proposition 2
We need to show that if fees (μ1,μ 2)  =( 1 ,1) are such that uH
1 = uH










,j=1 ,2a n dθ = H,L.
Then, uθ
j =( 1− μj)˜ uθ


















Dividing both sides of (1) by 1 − μj and maximizing the left-hand side w.r.t. p (with
cj =0 ) ,w eh a v e
˜ u
θ
j =m a x
p






It follows from Lemma 2 that the above equation has a unique solution ˜ uδ
j.N o t et h a t˜ uθ
j
does not depend on μj, and neither does the optimal price pθ
j. Also, since η1 >η 2,w e
have Q1(p) >Q 2(p) and it is straightforward to show that ˜ uθ
1 > ˜ uθ
2 and pθ
1 >p θ
2, θ = H,L.
Deﬁne
Q(ηj,z) = max
p [Qj(p)p +( 1− Qj(p))z]. (25)
Thus we have ˜ uθ
j = Q(ηj,δ θ˜ uθ







whenever η1 >η 2 and z1 >z 2. To see this, take the partial derivative of Q with respect
to z. By the Envelope Theorem, it is equal to 1−Qj(p), where p is the maximizer of (25).
Since Qj(p) is strictly increasing in ηj (see Proof of Lemma 5), the submodularity of Q is
immediate. Let z1 = δH˜ uH
1 and z2 = δL˜ uL
2. Using ˜ uH
1 > ˜ uL
1 > ˜ uL
2 and ˜ uH
1 > ˜ uH
2 > ˜ uL
2,w e
obtain inequality (24). End of Proof.
24Proof of Lemma 4
Solving (19) for uθ





1 − δθ(1 − Qi(pθ))
.









1 − δθ(1 − Qi(pθ))
.
By the argument provided in the Proof of Proposition 2, we know that ˜ uj and pθ are
independent from μi, and hence uθ
i(μi)=( 1− μi)˜ uθ
j is linear in μi. Also, solving (21) for
wθ









i,w h e r e ˜ wθ





i(μi)) = μi ˜ w
θ
i · G((1 − μi)˜ u
θ
j).
Taking the derivative with respect to μi and denoting z =( 1− μi)˜ uθ
j,w eo b t a i n
˜ w
θ
i · G(z) − μi ˜ w
θ



















Since by assumption on G (see Section 2) expression [G(z) − (¯ v − z)g(z)] is strictly in-
creasing in z, its derivative satisﬁes
2g(z) − (¯ v − z)g
 (z) > 0
and, furthermore, this inequality holds for every z ≤ ˜ uθ
j even after we replace ¯ v by ˜ uθ
j (as
˜ uθ
j ≤ ¯ v). Thus G(z) − (˜ uθ
j − z)g(z) is also strictly increasing in z ≤ ˜ uθ
j. Since z is strictly
decreasing in μi, it follows that μi ˜ wθ
i · G((1 − μi)˜ uθ
j) is strictly concave.
25Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Condition (10) means that H-type sellers prefer shop 1 when μ2 =0 . F r o m
Proposition 2, φH(0) <φ L(0). Thus, condition (10) implies that both types of sellers
prefer shop 1 when μ2 = 0 (and even more so at any higher closing fee of shop 2), and
hence, setting the monopoly closing fee is the best reply for shop 1.
Conversely, if a monopoly equilibrium exists, then after setting the monopoly closing
fee, μM
1 , shop 1 attracts sellers of all types for any closing fee of shop 2, including μ2 =0 .
Therefore, μM
1 ≤ φH(0). End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose that shops’ closing fees are (φH(0),0). Condition (12) means that H-
type sellers prefer shop 2 under the monopoly fee μM
1 , hence this is not the monopoly
equilibrium. Condition (13) mean that shop 1 has no incentive to increase its closing
fee to the level that would maximize the revenue from L-type sellers only (completely
ignoring H-type sellers); clearly, shop 1 cannot beneﬁt by a reduction μ1,a n ds h o p2
cannot beneﬁt by an increase of μ2.
Conversely, suppose a contestable monopoly equilibrium exists. In such an equilibrium,
to attract sellers of all types, shop 1 sets its closing fee at most φH(0), and (12) must
hold, otherwise shop 1 could have beneﬁted by setting closing fee μM
1 and obtaining the
monopoly equilibrium proﬁt. Similarly, (13) must hold, otherwise shop 1 could have
beneﬁted by setting closing fee μL
1. End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. To prove part (i), we need to show that the reverse segmentation, where L-type
sellers prefer shop 2 and H-type sellers prefer shop 1, cannot occur in equilibrium. This
is immediate by Proposition 2, according to which, for every pair of fees, H-type sellers
prefer shop 1 only if L-type sellers also prefer shop 1.
26Part (ii). Consider, say, shop 1. By part (i), the best-reply fee is an interior solution
of the problem of ﬁnding the best fee facing the population of L-type sellers only. But
this solution is equal to the unique closing fee on the monopoly market with only L-type
sellers, μL
1. End of Proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Equilibria in the case of η1 = η2 are fully characterized by Proposition 1.
Suppose that η1 >η 2. We described three types of equilibria, monopoly, contestable
monopoly, and market segmentation equilibrium and showed that if an equilibrium exists,
it is unique. It remains to show that no other equilibria may exist.










j ∈{ 0,1} for every j =1 ,2 and every θ = H,L.N o t e t h a t s is a monopoly or
contestable monopoly equilibrium if λH
2 = λL
2 = 0. Since η1 >η 2, clearly, λH
1 = λL
1 =0
cannot occur in equilibrium, as shop 1 can charge low enough closing fee to attract sellers
(see Figure 1). Next, note that if λH
1 =0a n dλL
2 =0 ,s is a market segmentation
equilibrium, and λH
2 =0a n dλL
1 = 0 cannot occur in equilibrium by Proposition 2.
Finally, suppose that 0 <λ θ
j < 1f o rs o m ej =1 ,2a n ds o m eθ = H,L,t h a ti s ,aθ-type
seller is indiﬀerent between two shops. Then s cannot be an equilibrium: by Proposition
1 (ii), at least one shop receives positive proﬁt and thus it can attract θ-type sellers with
probability one by marginally reducing its closing fee. End of Proof.
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